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Using a ﬁrm-level data set1 in Korea during the 1992–2000 period, this
paper attempts to examine the dynamic patterns in the allocation of credit
across ﬁrms. Supposedly, in Korea, the economic crisis in 1997 had a sig-
niﬁcant impact on the pattern in the allocation of credit across ﬁrms. In
particular, this paper aims to examine these dynamic patterns across large
and small ﬁrms after the crisis.
Corporate ﬁnancing issues are intimately related to the cause of the Ko-
rean crisis. For instance, the indebtedness of chaebol to banks is viewed as
having contributed much to the crisis.2 Among others, Krueger and Yoo
(2001) demonstrate that chaebol indebtedness is indeed the chief culprit of
the crisis. In this regard, since the outbreak of the ﬁnancial crisis in 1997,
the government has undertaken various reform measures to restructure the
ﬁnancial and corporate sectors.3 The new regulatory system is now under-
way to induce the ﬁnancial institutions to change their imprudent lending
practices, and the capital market began to force the chaebolto correct their
incentive structure. Supposedly, these postcrisis developments in Korea
have caused the chaebol and ﬁnancial institutions to change their previ-
ously imprudent (borrowing and lending) practices.
The paper suggests that large ﬁrms, to some extent, are leaving banks
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1. The data set covers most of the Korean ﬁrms except for extra-small ones.
2. The failure of the corporate governance of chaebolexacerbated the situation. For the fail-
ure of chaebol corporate governance before the crisis, see Joh (2003).
3. Bankruptcy policy reform was one of the essential elements in these structural reforms.
Lim (2002) studies empirically the post-crisis bankruptcy policy reform in Korea.and going to the capital market for their ﬁnancing after the crisis.4 The pa-
per also suggests that proﬁtable small ﬁrms are gaining easier access to
credit from ﬁnancial institutions after the crisis. There has been a shift in
the allocation of bank credit from large ﬁrms to small ﬁrms. Is this shift due
to lenders’ choice or due to borrowers’ changed incentives? The paper sug-
gests that the improved lending practices of banks contributed at least par-
tially to this shift of bank credit from large ﬁrms to small ﬁrms.5
This paper is organized as follows. Section 6.2 provides the aggregate
data on the corporate ﬁnancing sources in Korea during the 1992–2000 pe-
riod. Section 6.3 explains the ﬁrm-level data set. Section 6.4 examines the
dynamic patterns in the allocation of credit across ﬁrms, and section 6.5
concludes the paper with agenda for future research.
6.2 Aggregate Patterns in the Corporate Financing Sources
Table 6.1 shows the aggregate data for the sources of corporate ﬁnanc-
ing before and after the economic crisis. The numbers in table 6.1 are cal-
culated from the information given in various publications by the Bank of
Korea.6
The main reason we present this table is that it decomposes indirect ﬁ-
nance further into detailed sources—commercial banks, insurance com-
panies (including pension funds), short-term ﬁnance companies (e.g., mer-
chant banks), and other nonbank ﬁnancial intermediaries. Another point
concerning the table is that it has been constructed by aggregating all the
ﬁnancial transactions for all the ﬁrms in the Korean economy. Hence, we
could use this table to check the consistency in the ﬁrm-level data, for ex-
ample, whether there is any systematic bias in the ﬁrm-level data due to the
exclusion of extra-small ﬁrms.
After the crisis, in 1998–1999, the share of external ﬁnance in the total ﬁ-
nance sharply declines to 50 percent from about 70 percent, throughout
the 1990s until 1997.7
In 1998, as expected, the crisis completely changes the table for
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4. Shortly after the crisis, the corporate bond market took oﬀ with the weak regulatory in-
frastructure. This immature expansion led to liquidity crises in 1999 and 2001. See Lim (2002)
as well as Oh and Rhee (2002).
5. Borensztein and Lee (2002) examine the microdata on Korean listed ﬁrms in 1996–1998.
They suggest that chaebol-aﬃliated ﬁrms lost the preferential access to credit and that credit
was reallocated in favor of more eﬃcient ﬁrms.
6. The Economic Statistics Yearbook, Flow of Funds, Monthly Bulletin, and Web site (www.
bok.or.kr).
7. Although not shown in the table, the share of external ﬁnance in the total ﬁnance de-
clined steadily throughout the 1970s and 1980s, and until 1988. During this period (except for
the period of oil shocks), overseas export markets, together with emerging domestic markets,
helped Korean ﬁrms to realize large proﬁts. The ratio of internal ﬁnance to total ﬁnance was





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.corporate ﬁnancing sources. However, in 2000, when the crisis phases out,
the table for corporate ﬁnancing sources takes a somewhat diﬀerent com-
position compared to before the crisis.
First of all, the share of indirect ﬁnance does not recover the level before
the crisis. A look into the components of indirect ﬁnance is necessary. The
nonbank ﬁnancial intermediaries, except for insurance companies, lose
their share signiﬁcantly, compared with before the crisis. On the other
hand, the share of commercial banks increases to almost double the aver-
age level before the crisis. Second, in 2000, the composition of direct ﬁ-
nance changes compared to before the crisis. Equity takes away the share
of the borrowing from ﬁnancial markets (commercial paper, bonds, etc).
Finally, foreign borrowing increases its share signiﬁcantly.
6.3 The Firm-Level Data
This study uses detailed ﬁnancial information on the ﬁrms that have ex-
ternal audit reports. According to the Act on External Audit of Joint-Stock
Corporations, a ﬁrm with assets of 7 billion won or more must issue au-
dited ﬁnancial statements. The data thus include all the ﬁrms with assets
of 7 billion won or more. The total number of ﬁrms in the data is about
11,000.
The Financial Supervisory Commission is responsible for establishing
accounting and auditing standards, and the Securities and Futures Com-
mission is then responsible for the review of the audited ﬁnancial state-
ments issued by ﬁrms. Finally, National Information and Credit Evalua-
tion, Inc. (NICE) codes this public information into its database after
checking the consistency of the reported ﬁnancial statements.
From the NICE data, we can estimate only the borrowing from all ﬁ-
nancial intermediaries, not the borrowings from the detailed components
of indirect ﬁnance. However, table 6.2 shows that after the crisis, most of
the new lending by ﬁnancial intermediaries is, in fact, from commercial
banks, not from nonbank ﬁnancial institutions.
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Table 6.2 Summary Statistics of Firm-Level Data (simple mean, %)
All Firms in the Sample
1992–1996 1997–1998 1999–2000
EBIT/Asset 6.61578 3.79944 4.62773
Borrowing/Asset 0.38655 0.43713 0.37910
Loans from ﬁnancial institutions/Borrowing 0.76436 0.80880 0.83345
Bond ﬁnancing/Borrowing 0.07573 0.07605 0.05752
Note: Number of observations in sample is 11,026.6.3.1 Summary Statistics
Table 6.2 presents sample means for the key variables in the empirical
analysis. It divides the sample period into the three subperiods around the
crisis: 1992–1996, 1997–1998, and 1999–2000. Note that the ﬁnancial cri-
sis broke out in 1997 and that the economy began to recover in 1999 after
the crisis. Proﬁtability is measured by earnings before interest and tax pay-
ments (EBIT) divided by total assets. After the crisis, the share of loans in
asset increases compared with the precrisis period; on the other hand, the
weight of bond ﬁnancing decreases.
The ﬁnancing pattern varies according to the size of ﬁrms. For example,
the empirical distribution of the loans’ share in total asset has a diﬀerent
shape according to the size of ﬁrms. For this reason, we divide all individ-
ual ﬁrms into ten groups based on the distribution of asset size, and select
three representative size cohorts for presenting the empirical results. The
results are robust to minor changes in the thresholds. We employ the fol-
lowing three size cohorts: (1) the largest ﬁrms (top 1 percent in asset size),8
(2) the medium-sized ﬁrms (middle 10 percent in asset size), and (3) the
smallest ﬁrms (bottom 10 percent in asset size).
For the three size cohorts, table 6.3 provides sample means for the key
variables in the empirical analysis. It also divides the sample period into
the three subperiods around the crisis.
The statistics in table 6.3 present a diﬀerent picture compared to the one
in table 6.2. The aggregate numbers in table 6.2 do not fully capture the
changes in the ﬁnancing pattern experienced by heterogeneous ﬁrms dur-
ing this period. Proﬁtability evolves diﬀerently according to size groups.
Proﬁtability worsens for large and small ﬁrms, whereas it rebounds for
medium-sized ﬁrms. While the share of loans in asset decreases for large
ﬁrms, the opposite is the case for the other groups. After the crisis, large
ﬁrms ﬁnance more in the bond market, but the other groups have more lim-
ited access to the bond market compared to the precrisis period.
6.3.2 Firm Size Distribution
Figure 6.1 shows the yearly ﬁrm-size distributions for all the ﬁrms in the
sample before and after the crisis. Before the crisis, the distribution shifts to
the right-hand side—implying on average an increase in ﬁrm size. The shape
of the distribution gets skewed to the right gradually over time until 1997.
We ﬁnd relatively fewer small ﬁrms over time in the yearly distributions.
After the crisis, it is hard to ﬁnd a clear pattern in the shift of the
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8. For the case of large ﬁrms, we present the results using this particular cohort, but deﬁn-
ing the largest ﬁrms diﬀerently (e.g., the top 5 percent, or top 10 percent) does not change the














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Fig. 6.1 All sample ﬁrms, log of total asset: A, before the crisis, 1992–1997;
B, after the crisis, 1997–2000
Source: Author’s calculation for all the ﬁrms in the NICE data.distribution itself. However, the left-hand tail of the distribution—the
smallest ﬁrms in the sample—becomes thicker after the crisis. The relative
frequency of the smallest ﬁrms in the sample increases after the crisis. This
thicker left tail could occur either from an increased number of new en-
trants or from the inclusion of extra-small ﬁrms that were previously ex-
cluded from the sample. Note that we observe the opposite before the cri-
sis—the left-hand tail of the distribution getting thinner.
6.3.3 Firm Proﬁtability Distribution
Figure 6.2 presents the yearly proﬁtability distributions for all the ﬁrms
in the sample before and after the crisis. The yearly distributions remain
the same before the crisis. The crisis signiﬁcantly aﬀects the proﬁtability
distribution in 1997, indicating, on average, a decrease in ﬁrm proﬁtability.
After the crisis, the proﬁtability distribution shifts much to the right or left
depending on the macroeconomic situation. In fact, after the crisis, the
magnitude of the business cycle becomes larger than compared to the pre-
crisis period.9
Figure 6.3 shows that the small and medium-sized ﬁrms have more dis-
persed distributions in 1992–2000. Since this pattern remains the same in
the sample period, we do not present the yearly distributions here. Large
ﬁrms are more homogeneous in terms of proﬁtability compared to the
other size cohorts.
Figure 6.4 shows that the crisis had an impact on the shape of prof-
itability for small ﬁrms. After the crisis (1997–2000), the distribution gets
more dispersed over time. After the crisis small ﬁrms become a more het-
erogeneous group compared to the precrisis period.
6.4 Financing Pattern and the Crisis: Micro-Evidence
In section 6.3.1, the summary statistics of key ﬁnancing variables hint
that the heterogeneity of ﬁrms is important in understanding the evolution
of the ﬁnancing pattern after the crisis. The sample means of key ﬁnancing
variables also hint at the following pattern around the crisis: the largest
ﬁrms are leaving ﬁnancial intermediaries and switching directly to the ﬁ-
nancial markets for their ﬁnancing, whereas the small and medium-sized
ﬁrms are increasing their dependency on ﬁnancial intermediaries for ﬁ-
nancing. In this section, we test these hypotheses rigorously. To get genuine
cross-sectional results, we must control for the eﬀect of the business cycles.
The empirical distributions of key ﬁnancing variables have diﬀerent
shapes according to the size of ﬁrms and evolve diﬀerently after the crisis.
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9. The annual growth rates of GDP after the crisis are 5.0 percent (1997), –6.7 percent
(1998), 10.9 percent (1999), and 8.8 percent (2000), whereas, before the crisis, the diﬀerence
between the high and low peak years does not exceed 4 percent.A
B
Fig. 6.2 All sample ﬁrms, EBIT/total asset: A, before the crisis, 1992–1997;
B, after the crisis, 1997–2000
Source: Author’s calculation for all the ﬁrms in the NICE data.In this section, therefore, we also present the result from comparing the
empirical distributions of key ﬁnancing variables.
6.4.1 Loans from Financial Institutions
Table 6.4 shows the regressions of the loan-borrowing ratio (deﬁned as
the borrowing from ﬁnancial intermediaries divided by total borrowing)
on the dummy variables denoting the size cohort interacted with year dum-
mies and on the macrovariables (growth rate of gross domestic product
[GDP], interest rate). The macrovariables control for the eﬀect of the busi-
ness cycles. In table 6.4, therefore, the reported coeﬃcient for the speciﬁc
year indicates the loan-borrowing ratio’s diﬀerence between the size cohort
in that speciﬁc year and all the other ﬁrms in the whole sample period.
Table 6.4 shows the regression results for the three size cohorts (top 1 per-
cent, middle 10 percent, bottom 10 percent).
After the crisis (in 1998–2000), the largest ﬁrms signiﬁcantly decrease
the share of loans in total borrowing. The coeﬃcients for 1998–2000 are
larger than 0.3 (all signiﬁcant), whereas the coeﬃcients for 1992–1997 are
smaller than 0.2 (also all signiﬁcant). That is, after the crisis, the largest
ﬁrms are leaving ﬁnancial intermediaries for their ﬁnancing.
For the small ﬁrms this share jumps to a higher number from 1995 and
stays more or less there even after the crisis. The coeﬃcients for 1992–
1994 are smaller than –0.2 (all signiﬁcant), whereas the coeﬃcients for
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Fig. 6.3 All sample ﬁrms, EBIT/total asset: sample period, 1992–2000
Source: Author’s calculation for all the ﬁrms in the NICE data.A
B
Fig. 6.4 Small-sized ﬁrms (bottom 10%), EBIT/total asset: A, before the crisis;
B, after the crisis
Source: Author’s calculation for all the ﬁrms in the NICE data.1996–2000 are larger than zero (in 1995, –0.03); these coeﬃcients are all
signiﬁcant except in 2000. The small ﬁrms did not have much access to ﬁ-
nancial intermediaries in 1992–1994, but they have better access to the
loans from ﬁnancial intermediaries afterward.
For the medium-sized ﬁrms, the share of loans in total borrowing does
not show any marked trend around the crisis. Note that the summary sta-
tistics in section 6.3.1 suggested a diﬀerent interpretation for the behavior
of medium-sized ﬁrms.
Empirical Distribution of Loans for Diﬀerent Cohorts
Figure 6.5 shows the distribution of the loan-borrowing ratio for the
largest cohort (top 1 percent of ﬁrms in asset size) before and after the cri-
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Table 6.4 The Eﬀect of the Crisis on the Loan-Borrowing Ratio for Each Size Cohort
Dependent Variableb
Independent Large Firms Medium-Sized Firms Small Firms
Variablea (top 1% in asset size) (middle 10% in asset size) (bottom 10% in asset size)
1992 –0.092114** 0.038763** –0.238474**
(–2.62) (2.87) (–13.00)
1993 –0.158658** –0.023511* –0.290327**
(–4.55) (–1.84) (–18.11)
1994 –0.142179** 0.025618** –0.228863**
(–4.14) (2.16) (–14.64)
1995 –0.129324** 0.059797** –0.030198**
(–3.79) (5.29) (–1.99)
1996 –0.167552** 0.030885** 0.053789**
(–4.91) (2.77) (3.42)
1997 –0.167804** 0.044728** 0.045980**
(–4.96) (4.27) (4.15)
1998 –0.301641** 0.042048** 0.070248**
(–8.87) (3.67) (5.88)
1999 –0.321025** 0.057508** 0.044566**
(–9.54) (5.51) (4.97)
2000 –0.329379** 0.045512** 0.012498
(–9.84) (4.06) (1.21)
GDP growth rate –0.003067** –0.003040** –0.002224**
(–10.53) (–9.93) (–7.36)
Yields to corporate  –0.016176** –0.015893** –0.013788**
bonds (–20.77) (–19.42) (–17.11)
No. of observations 56,990 56,990 56,990
Notes: Numbers in parenthesis are t-values. Loan-borrowing ratio refers to the borrowing from ﬁnan-
cial markets divided by total borrowing.
aDummy variable denoting a speciﬁc cohort interacted with year dummies.
bBorrowing from ﬁnancial intermediaries/total borrowing.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.Sources of Corporate Financing and Economic Crisis in Korea 171
A
B
Fig. 6.5 Largest ﬁrms (top 1%), loan/borrowing: A, before the crisis; B, after
the crisis
Source: Author’s calculation for all the ﬁrms in the NICE data.
sis. After the crisis (in 1998–2000), the loan-borrowing ratio distribution
for the largest ﬁrms clearly shifts leftward, as seen in panel B. This leftward
shift starts partly in 1997 during the crisis.
For the small ﬁrms (bottom 10 percent ﬁrms in asset size) the distribu-
tion of the loan-borrowing ratio shifts to the right markedly in 1996 (actu-ally in 1995, although not shown in the paper) and maintains more or less
this pattern even after the crisis (ﬁg. 6.6).
In ﬁgure 6.6, panel A, we note that, until 1994, a certain portion of the
ﬁrms in our database lacks access to ﬁnancial intermediaries for their cor-
porate ﬁnancing. One could see a certain density around zero. However, af-
ter 1994, this pattern changes: the density around zero continues to disap-
pear until 1997, and, after the crisis, appears again, but on a much smaller
scale than before 1995. Panels A and B in ﬁgure 6.6 make another interest-
ing point. After 1994, we continue to see a peak at 1 and a certain mass
around 1, which indicates that these ﬁrms depend (or do not depend) com-
pletely on the loans from ﬁnancial intermediaries for their borrowing.
For the medium-sized ﬁrms, the share of loans in total borrowing does
not show any marked changes before or after the crisis, except that, after
the crisis, we could see more cluster around 1 (ﬁg. 6.7).
6.4.2 Determinants of the Changes in the Allocation of Loans
Why do we observe such shifts in the allocation of loans by ﬁnancial in-
stitutions as documented in section 6.4.1? Are they reﬂecting the ﬁrms’
spontaneous choice for ﬁnancing sources as a result of corporate restruc-
turing, or did the ﬁnancial reform cause ﬁnancial institutions to shift their
lending patterns? To see whether this is the case, we attempt to test the
eﬀect of individual ﬁrm proﬁtability on the shift in allocation of loans by
ﬁnancial institutions.
Table 6.5 shows the regressions of the change in loans on ﬁrm proﬁtabil-
ity (interacted with year dummy) for small ﬁrms. We also test the eﬀect of
the aﬃliation with chaebol on the access to loans. The chaebol dummy dis-
tinguishes the top thirty chaebol from the others.
Table 6.5 suggests the interpretation that, for the small ﬁrms, proﬁtabil-
ity is an important factor in determining access to loans by ﬁnancial insti-
tutions after the crisis.10Financial institutions actively search for proﬁtable
small ﬁrms to provide loans after the crisis. In section 6.3.4, we pointed out
that the crisis had an impact on the shape of the proﬁtability for small
ﬁrms. The proﬁtability distribution becomes more dispersed after the cri-
sis. It means that selecting eﬃcient small ﬁrms became more diﬃcult after
the crisis.
Before the crisis, proﬁtability was not a factor in the access of small ﬁrms
to loans; on the contrary, ineﬃcient small ﬁrms did have more access to
loans by ﬁnancial institutions. This reﬂects the fact that small ﬁrms were
protected through various regulations by the government before the crisis.
Note that the aﬃliation with chaebol has a negative eﬀect on access to
loans. In Korea, small ﬁrms aﬃliated with chaebol usually do not get
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10. For medium-sized and large ﬁrms, the regression of the change in loans on ﬁrm prof-
itability did not produce meaningful results.A
B
Fig. 6.6 Small-sized ﬁrms (bottom 10%), loan/borrowing: A, before the crisis;
B, after the crisis
Source: Author’s calculation for all the ﬁrms in the NICE data.A
B
Fig. 6.7 Medium-sized ﬁrms (middle 10%), loan/borrowing: A, before the crisis;
B, after the crisis
Source: Author’s calculation for all the ﬁrms in the NICE data.protection but rather face tight regulations to the eﬀect of protecting other
independent small ﬁrms. This kind of regulation has been gradually
shrinking since the crisis.
6.4.3 Total Borrowing
In section 6.4.1, it is suggested that the largest ﬁrms are leaving ﬁnancial
intermediaries for their corporate ﬁnancing after the crisis. Then, the ques-
tion arises: do the large ﬁrms decrease investment and scale down their
business? Otherwise, do they ﬁnd other sources of ﬁnancing after the cri-
sis? To check this, we look at total borrowing before and after the crisis.
Table 6.6 shows the regressions of the borrowing-dependency ratio (de-
ﬁned as total borrowing divided by total assets) on the dummy variables
denoting the size cohort interacted with year dummies and on the macro-
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Table 6.5 Determinant of Loans for Small Firms
Independent Variable Dependent Variablea
Proﬁtability   1993 Dummy –6.27416**
(–4.87)
Proﬁtability   1994 Dummy –4.56897**
(–4.23)
Proﬁtability   1995 Dummy –2.20905**
(–2.03)
Proﬁtability   1996 Dummy –2.24397**
(–2.00)
Proﬁtability   1997 Dummy 3.39365**
(3.36)
Proﬁtability   1998 Dummy –1.68222**
(–2.41)
Proﬁtability   1999 Dummy 1.09281**
(2.76)
Proﬁtability   1000 Dummy 1.01871**
(2.84)
Chaebol Dummy   (1993–1997) Dummy –86.47024**
(–2.37)
Chaebol Dummy   (1998–2000) Dummy –85.39975*
(–1.73)
GDP growth rate –4.84860**
(–5.33)
Yield to corporate bonds 2.47850
(0.93)
No. of observations 4,388
Notes: Unit of loans   10 million won. Numbers in parentheses are t-values. Proﬁtability
refers to the EBIT divided by total assets.
aChange in loans.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.variables (growth rate of GDP, interest rate). In table 6.6, the reported
coeﬃcient for the speciﬁc year indicates the borrowing-dependency dif-
ferences between the size cohort in that speciﬁc year and all the other
ﬁrms in the whole sample period. Table 6.6 shows the regression re-
sults for the three size cohorts (top 1 percent, middle 10 percent, bottom
10 percent).
The crisis aﬀected the borrowing-dependency ratio of all the cohorts
only during the crisis. When the crisis died out, the borrowing-asset ratio
returned to the previous trend. The share of borrowing in total assets went
up much more for small ﬁrms during the crisis than for the other size co-
horts. Unlike the others, small ﬁrms had no other cushions (e.g., equity, re-
tained earnings) to absorb the adverse eﬀect of the crisis.
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Table 6.6 Test of Borrowing-Dependency Ratio for Size Cohorts
Dependent Variableb
Independent Large Firms Medium-Sized Firms Small Firms
Variablea (top 1% in asset size) (middle 10% in asset size) (bottom 10% in asset size)
1992 0.065951* 0.002772 –0.147234**
(1.83) (0.20) (–9.24)
1993 0.087718** 0.000540 –0.131432**
(2.46) (0.04) (–9.44)
1994 0.100312** 0.008327 –0.149869**
(2.82) (0.71) (–11.53)
1995 0.098005** 0.023694** –0.108633**
(2.77) (2.08) (–8.28)
1996 0.133107** 0.032537** –0.108653**
(3.76) (2.92) (–8.22)
1997 0.194158** 0.054186** 0.041092**
(5.57) (5.16) (3.72)
1998 0.132828** –0.021260* 0.001323
(3.79) (–1.86) (0.11)
1999 0.077798** 0.002175 –0.009230**
(2.21) (0.20) (–9.72)
2000 0.099435** –0.015028 –0.104478**
(2.84) (–1.29) (32.23)
GDP growth rate –0.001729** –0.002001** –0.001364**
(–5.93) (–6.53) (–4.49)
Yields to corporate  0.002870** 0.002403** 0.002480**
bonds (3.64) (2.91) (3.03)
No. of observations 61,732 61,732 61,732
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are t-values. Borrowing-dependency ratio refers to the total borrowing
divided by total assets.
aDummy variable denoting a speciﬁc cohort interacted with year dummies.
bTotal borrowing/total asset.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.6.4.4 Financing in the Bond Market
The above result implies that the large ﬁrms moved to some other
sources of ﬁnancing after the crisis. This section will show that the large
ﬁrms went to the bond market to compensate for the decrease in loans by
ﬁnancial institutions. This was hinted in section 6.2.1. We test it formally
in the following.
Table 6.7 shows the regressions of the bond-borrowing ratio (deﬁned as
the borrowing from ﬁnancial markets divided by total borrowing) on the
dummy variables denoting the size cohort interacted with year dummies
and on the macrovariables (growth rate of GDP, interest rate). In table 6.7,
the reported coeﬃcient for the speciﬁc year indicates the bond-borrowing
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Table 6.7 The Eﬀect of the Crisis on the Bond-Borrowing Ratio for Each
Size Cohort
Dependent Variableb
Independent Large Firms Top 6–10% Top 11–20%
Variablea (top 1% in asset size) in Asset Size in Asset Size
1992 0.160692** 0.103350** 0.047441**
(2.62) (11.35) (6.94)
1993 0.185830** 0.132925** 0.073764**
(4.55) (14.98) (11.17)
1994 0.245725** 0.150490** 0.077310**
(4.14) (17.09) (11.96)
1995 0.248630** 0.156919** 0.075703**
(3.79) (17.78) (11.76)
1996 0.266046** 0.172363** 0.084974**
(4.91) (19.57) (13.27)
1997 0.297227** 0.171449** 0.087462**
(4.96) (19.65) (13.98)
1998 0.421412** 0.178142** 0.067650**
(8.87) (19.35) (9.98)
1999 0.446375** 0.196404** 0.049279**
(9.54) (21.32) (7.50)
2000 0.393401** 0.160074** 0.033200**
(9.84) (17.17) (4.79)
GDP growth rate 0.000144** 0.000067 –0.000009
(–10.53) (0.39) (–0.05)
Yields to corporate bonds 0.003134** 0.002853** 0.002246**
(–20.77) (6.21) (4.67)
No. of observations 56,990 56,990 56,990
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are t-values. Bond-borrowing ratio refers to the borrowing
from ﬁnancial markets divided by total borrowing.
aDummy variable denoting a speciﬁc cohort interacted with year dummies.
bBorrowing from ﬁnancial markets/total borrowing.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.ratio’s diﬀerences between the size cohort in that speciﬁc year and all the
other ﬁrms in the whole sample period. Table 6.7 shows the regression re-
sults for the three size cohorts (top 1 percent, top 6–10 percent, top 11–20
percent). The reason for choosing a diﬀerent set of cohorts for table 6.5 is
that, for the sample period, the small and medium-sized ﬁrms (the cohorts
we used in the regression analysis before) do not have access to borrowing
from ﬁnancial markets.
After the crisis (in 1998–2000), the largest ﬁrms markedly increase the
share of bond ﬁnancing in total borrowing. The coeﬃcients for 1998–2000
are around 0.4 (all signiﬁcant), whereas the coeﬃcients for 1992–1997 are
smaller than 0.3 (also all signiﬁcant).
For all the size cohorts, the share of bond ﬁnancing in total asset in-
creases gradually from 1992 to 1996. This is due to the ﬁnancial liberaliza-
tion policy gradually taken by the government since the early 1990s. Dur-
ing this period the size of the bond market in Korea gradually expanded.
The bond market developed more rapidly with the speed-up of ﬁnancial
liberalization policy after the crisis.
Empirical Distribution of Bond Financing for Diﬀerent Cohorts
Figure 6.8 shows the bond-borrowing ratio distributions before and
after the crisis for the largest cohort. After the crisis (in 1998–2000), the
bond-borrowing ratio distribution for the largest ﬁrms shifts clearly to the
right (panel B).
In ﬁgure 6.9 we show the similar ﬁgures for another size cohort (top 11–
20 percent of ﬁrms in asset size). This cohort includes, in fact, the smallest
ﬁrms to have any access to the bond market at all in the sample period. For
this cohort, the bond-borrowing ratio distribution shifts to the right mar-
ginally before the crisis. After the crisis, however, the distribution shifts
back to the left. There is a large peak around zero in 1999 and the distri-
bution becomes degenerate in 2000 (i.e., this cohort does not have any ac-
cess to the bond market). A large proportion of the bonds that were issued
during the crisis were at risk of default, especially after the demise of the
Daewoo group (one of the top four chaebol at that time in Korea) in 1999.
This, in turn, put the whole market for corporate bonds into a state of mal-
function in 1999 and in 2000.
6.5 Concluding Remarks
The paper documents that large ﬁrms, to some extent, are leaving banks
and going to the capital market for their ﬁnancing after the crisis.11 The
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11. Clearly, the liberalization of ﬁnancial markets, which happened at an accelerating rate
after the crisis, contributed to broaden the supply base of various corporate ﬁnancing sources.
But, for further deepening of the supply base of various corporate ﬁnancing sources, Korea
needs better protection of investors’ rights.A
B
Fig. 6.8 Large-sized ﬁrms (top 1%), bond/borrowing: A, before the crisis; B, after
the crisis
Source: Author’s calculation for all the ﬁrms in the NICE data.180 Youngjae Lim
A
B
Fig. 6.9 Large ﬁrms (top 10%–top 20%), bond/borrowing: A, before the crisis;
B, after the crisis
Source: Author’s calculation for all the ﬁrms in the NICE data.paper also shows that proﬁtable small ﬁrms are gaining easier access to
credit by ﬁnancial institutions after the crisis. Financial institutions are re-
allocating their credit from large ﬁrms to small ﬁrms after the crisis. Why
do we observe such shifts in the allocation of loans by ﬁnancial institu-
tions? Are they reﬂecting the ﬁrms’ spontaneous choice for ﬁnancing
sources as a result of corporate restructuring? Otherwise, did the ﬁnancial
reform cause ﬁnancial institutions to change their lending practices? The
paper suggests that the banks’ improved lending practices contributed at
least partially to this shift.
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Comment Francis T. Lui
The Asian ﬁnancial crisis of 1997 and 1998 has caused such enormous
losses for the economies involved that it is important for them to learn from
what has happened so that similar mistakes can be avoided in the future.
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Francis T. Lui is professor of economics and director of the Center for Economic Devel-
opment at Hong Kong University of Science and Technology.Among the many possible causes of the crisis, imprudent lending to cor-
porations, induced by various kinds of moral hazard behavior, often has
been regarded as a main culprit. Arguably, this turned on the whole chain
of events that started in Thailand. In Korea, where chaebol indebtedness
was also a big issue, the economy quickly was aﬀected by the crisis.
With this background, it is natural for economists to ask some com-
pelling questions. What was the nature of corporate ﬁnancing before the
crisis? How did corporations ﬁnance their investments? How did the cor-
porate ﬁnancial structures change after the crisis? How did the size of the
ﬁrms aﬀect their proﬁts and ﬁnancial structures? What lessons can we
learn from the events? These questions should be addressed both empiri-
cally and theoretically. Youngjae Lim’s paper, using a large database on
Korean ﬁrms, is an attempt to answer some of these questions from an em-
pirical perspective. Speciﬁcally, it focuses on what happened to the sources
of corporate ﬁnancing of ﬁrms of diﬀerent sizes. Since papers of this kind
can provide us with useful information on what actually happened, they
should be very much welcome by the profession.
The approach used in the paper basically involves the following. First,
with occasional minor deviations, it classiﬁes ﬁrms into three major cate-
gories: the largest ﬁrms, those of medium size, and the smallest ones. Sec-
ond, it examines the sources of ﬁnancing of each of these ﬁrm categories in
diﬀerent years from 1992 to 2000. The comparison therefore can be done
both cross-sectionally and longitudinally. Sources of funds being studied
include borrowing from ﬁnancial intermediaries and borrowing from ﬁ-
nancial markets. The paper also compares proﬁtability of the three cate-
gories of ﬁrms over time.
Three methods are used to organize the data. First, descriptive statistics,
including the means and standard deviations of the variables involved, are
presented for every category of ﬁrm before, during, and after the Asian ﬁ-
nancial crisis. The main variables are “borrowing from ﬁnancial interme-
diaries” and “borrowing from ﬁnancial markets,” each divided by total
borrowing. Second, the density functions of these variables for diﬀerent
types of ﬁrms in diﬀerent years are presented. Readers can inspect the
graphs to arrive at their conclusions. Third, a more formal statistical ap-
proach involving diﬀerent sources of ﬁnancing or proﬁtability as depend-
ent variables is used. The main explanatory variables are dummies repre-
senting diﬀerent types of ﬁrms in diﬀerent years. In addition, GDP growth
rates and yields to corporate bonds are used to isolate the eﬀects of busi-
ness cycles.
These three ways of organizing the data essentially yield the same results.
To some extent, there is redundancy in employing all three methods in the
paper. Since the ﬁrst two cannot control for the inﬂuences of business
cycles, which obscure the eﬀects of the crisis on the ﬁnancial structure, they
are inferior to the third, which is already suﬃcient to tell the main stories
182 Youngjae Limof this paper. Readers can go through it much more eﬃciently by just pay-
ing attention to the part on statistical tests.
One may complain that the reliance on many dummy variables may in-
troduce too much arbitrariness in the regression model. There are various
ways to reduce the number of dummies. For example, one can construct
continuous variables based on the sizes of the ﬁrms, as measured by the val-
ues of their assets. This probably will not generate major improvements,
but the author may know better how robust his results are.
Another drawback of the paper is the short time-series of data, which
last from 1992 to 2000, just a couple of years after the Asian ﬁnancial cri-
sis. Although there is an attempt to control for business cycles, it is not
clear that the duration of the data is long enough to tell whether the post-
crisis changes in ﬁnancial structures are permanent or transitory. This
problem cannot be resolved until more data are available over time.
What are the main ﬁndings of the paper? After the crisis, the largest ﬁrms
have big declines in their borrowing from ﬁnancial intermediaries. There
is, however, no major change in total borrowing. The declines in loans by
intermediaries are compensated for by sizable increases in corporate bond
ﬁnancing. While there are no obvious changes in the sources of ﬁnancing
for medium-sized ﬁrms, new patterns for the smallest ones have emerged.
Before the crisis, small ﬁrms were less dependent than medium ﬁrms on
loans by ﬁnancial intermediaries. However, after the crisis, their borrowing
from intermediaries exhibits signiﬁcant increases. Because of the small size
of these ﬁrms, they typically have no access to ﬁnancing through corporate
bonds. It should also be noted that the proﬁtability of the small ﬁrms has
been declining over time. The distributions of proﬁts both across the entire
sample of ﬁrms, and across the smallest ﬁrms, appears to be widening af-
ter the crisis. The small ﬁrms seem to have become both riskier and less
proﬁtable.
These results, while valuable for their own sake, are descriptive in nature.
They tell us what happened, but not the reason it happened. Hence it is
rather diﬃcult to directly infer any major lessons from them. In a sense,
they raise more questions than have been answered. For instance, the pa-
per does not let us know whether the decline in loans provided by ﬁnancial
intermediaries to large corporations is due to the reluctance of these inter-
mediaries to lend them money, or due to the voluntary choice of the ﬁrms
to choose other means of ﬁnancing. Has the cost of ﬁnancing by interme-
diaries been raised enough to correct for moral hazard? Do ﬁnancial mar-
kets in Korea possess better information than banks, so that the former can
provide cheaper loans to the large ﬁrms? Is it true that bond ﬁnancing has
become more important only because the ﬁnancial markets in Korea are
now more developed? Is the Asian ﬁnancial crisis just a historical coinci-
dence, having nothing to do with the changing ﬁnancial structures for the
large ﬁrms? As for the small ﬁrms, is it true that intermediaries are more
Sources of Corporate Financing and Economic Crisis in Korea 183willing than before to lend them money? Are the decline in proﬁtability and
the increase in risks caused by worsening of the investment environment?
Alternatively, are these simply due to the entry of many inexperienced
small ﬁrms? The last question can be answered partially if data on the num-
ber of newly registered ﬁrms are available.
One can continue to lengthen the list of questions related to the changes
in sources of corporate ﬁnancing in Korea. Clearly, no one author is re-
sponsible for answering all the questions. This being said, the paper would
make a better contribution had the author been able to provide more insti-
tutional details on the Korean ﬁnancial markets and to oﬀer coherent ex-
planations for his descriptive empirical ﬁndings. There is need for more
theoretical papers in this area.
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